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ABSTRACT
Modeling of Distributed Real-time Embedded systems using
Architecture Description Language provides the foundations
for various levels of analysis: scheduling, reliability, consis-
tency, etc.; but also allows for automatic code generation.
A challenge is to demonstrate that generated code matches
quality required for safety-critical systems. In the scope of
the AADL, the Ocarina toolchain proposes code generation
towards the Ada Ravenscar profile with restrictions for High-
Integrity. It has been extensively used in the space domain
as part of the TASTE project within the European Space
Agency.
In this paper, we illustrate how the combined use of Ada
2012 and SPARK 2014 significantly increases code quality
and exhibits absence of run-time errors at both run-time and
generated code levels.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software/Program Verification]: Correctness proofs,
Formal methods, Programming by contract; I.6.5 [Model
Development]: Modeling methodologies
General Terms
Design, Languages, Verification
Keywords
AADL; Ada 2012; SPARK 2014; Ocarina
1. INTRODUCTION
The Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) paradigm
allows for a high-level description of a system, its analysis
and eventually its automatic generation. Significant efforts
have been undertaken to design modeling frameworks that
support this view with a sufficient level of expression and
fidelity towards the system being built. Besides, MBSE al-
ready demonstrated capability for scheduling and reliability
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assessment in combination with analysis tools . This pro-
vides foundations for a wide support for the engineering of
safety-critical systems.
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language, stan-
dardized by SAE International [10], provides such an inte-
grated framework for the modeling of safety-critical systems.
Combined with the Ocarina code generation toolchain, it
allows for the automatic code generation towards Ada run-
times using a restricted middleware: PolyORB-HI/Ada. Both
generated code and runtime were initially written in Ada95,
with significant effort done to ensure compatibility with both
the Ravenscar profile and High-Integrity restrictions such as
absence of dynamic features (object-orientation, memory al-
location, streams, etc.). This greatly reduces the benefit of
code generation compared to traditional hand coding strate-
gies in the context of safety-critical systems: the only strat-
egy to ensure absence of run-time errors was through careful
code review and testing of the generated code on the target.
The advent of Ada 2012 programming-by-contract ap-
proach, and the availability of SPARK 2014 language and
toolset to assess a) that contracts are true, and b) the ab-
sence of runtime errors promise to increase confidence in
source code, and stronger link with formalized specifications
of programs. In the following, we illustrate how the use of
these two technologies allows us to streamline code gener-
ation and analysis effort by providing easier access to code
quality assessment.
In section 2 we present the AADL and some existing tools
to support the model-based engineering of embedded sys-
tems. In section 3, we outline the basic principles of the
PolyORB-HI/Ada runtime, inherited from the schizophrenic
middleware architecture deployed in the PolyORB middle-
ware,and the code generation strategies used in the Ocarina
toolchain. In section 4, we discuss modernization of the
initial code base to take advantage of Ada 2012’s new con-
structs, and how we had to overcome some existing limita-
tions in the current SPARK2014. In section 5 we show how
SPARK 2014 allows us to demonstrate absence of run-time
errors of the middleware components. Finally, we provide
some elements for future works.
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AADLV2
The“Architecture Analysis and Design Language”(AADL) [10]
is a textual and graphical language for model-based engi-
neering of embedded real-time systems. AADL is used to
design and analyze software and hardware architectures of
embedded real-time systems.
Figure 1: IST-ASSERT demonstrator
The AADL allows for the description of both software
and hardware parts of a system. It focuses on the definition
of clear block interfaces, and separates the implementations
from these interfaces. From the separate description of these
blocks, one can build an assembly of blocks that represents
the full system. To take into account the multiple ways to
connect components, the AADL defines different connection
patterns: subcomponent, connection, binding. For example,
figure 1 provides the graphical descrition of a case study used
in the scope of the ASSERT project.
An AADL model can incorporate non-architectural ele-
ments: non-functional properties (execution time, priority,
scheduler, . . . ) and behavioral or fault descriptions. It is
hence possible to use AADL as a backbone to describe all
the aspects of a system. Let us review these elements in the
following.
An AADL description is made of components. Each com-
ponent category describes well-identified elements of the ac-
tual architecture, using the same vocabulary of system or
software engineering. The AADL standard defines software
components (data, thread, thread group, subprogram, pro-
cess) and execution platform components (memory, bus, pro-
cessor, device, virtual processor, virtual bus) and hy-
brid components (system) or imprecise (abstract).
Component declarations have to be instantiated into sub-
components of other components in order to model an archi-
tecture. At the top-level, a system contains all the compo-
nent instances. Most components can have subcomponents,
so that an AADL description is hierarchical. A complete
AADL description must provide a top-most level system
that will contain certain kind of components (processor, pro-
cess, bus, device, abstract and memory), thus providing the
root of the architecture tree. The architecture in itself is the
instantiation of this system: the root system.
The interface of a component is called component type. It
provides features (e.g. communication ports). Components
communicate one with another by connecting their features.
A given component type correspond zero or several imple-
mentations. Each of them describes the internal structure
of the components: subcomponents, connections between
those subcomponents, and refine non-functional properties.
The AADL defines the notion of properties. They model
non-functional properties that can be attached to model el-
ements (components, connections, features, instances, etc.).
Properties are typed attributes that specify constraints or
characteristics that apply to the elements of the architecture
such as clock frequency of a processor, execution time of a
thread, bandwidth of a bus. Some standard properties are
defined, e.g. for timing aspects; but it is possible to define
new properties for different analysis (e.g. to define particu-
lar security policies). Besides, the language is defined by a
companion standard document that defines legality rules for
component assemblies, its static and execution semantics.
AADL’s initial requirement document mentions analysis
as the key objective. AADL is backed with a large set of
analysis tools1, covering many different domains: schedul-
ing analysis like Cheddar [11] and MAST [5]; dependability
assessment: AADL provides an annex for modeling propa-
gation of error, like COMPASS project [3], or ADAPT [6];
behavioral analysis: mapping to formal methods and asso-
ciated model checkers have been defined for Petri Nets [9],
RT-Maude [8] and many others code generation: Ocarina
implements Ada and C code generators for distributed real-
time embedded systems [7].
3. CODE GENERATION FROM AADL
Automatic code generation from AADL models require
first a comprehensive definition of a versatile middleware.
Versatility is required so as to ensure a consistent mapping
from AADL concerns (multiplicity of schedulers, transport
protocols) to well-defined implementable services. Such ver-
satility has been captured in the schizophrenic middleware
architecture and later used in the Ocarina code generation
toolset.
3.1 Schizophrenic middleware architecture
In previous projects, we defined the “schizophrenic mid-
dleware architecture” [13]. It separates concerns between
distribution model, API, communication protocols, and their
implementation by refining the definition and role of person-
alities.
The schizophrenic architecture consists of 3 layers: ap-
plication-level and protocol-level personalities built around
a neutral core. The user’s application interacts with appli-
cation personalities; protocol personalities operate with the
network.
Application personalities constitute the adaptation layer
between application components and the middleware through
a dedicated API or code generator. They provide APIs to
interface application components with the core middleware;
they interact with the core layer in order to allow the ex-
change of requests between entities. Application personali-
ties can either support specifications such as CORBA, JMS,
etc. or dedicated API for specific needs.
Protocol personalities handle the mapping of personality-
neutral requests (representing interactions between applica-
tion entities) onto messages exchanged using a chosen com-
munication network and protocol. Protocol personalities can
instantiate middleware protocols such as IIOP (for CORBA),
SOAP (for Web Services), etc.
The neutral core acts as an adaptation layer between ap-
plication and protocol personalities. It manages execution
resources and provides the necessary abstractions to trans-
parently pass requests between protocol and application per-
1An updated list of supporting tools, projects and papers
can be found on the official AADL web site http://www.
aadl.info.
Figure 2: Services of a schizophrenic middleware
sonalities in a neutral way. It is completely independent
from both application and protocol personalities.
The neutral core layer enables the selection of any combi-
nation of application and/or protocol personalities. Several
personalities can be collocated and cooperate in a given mid-
dleware instance, leading to its “schizophrenic” nature.
The middleware core provides neutral services that cor-
respond to the identification of the key functions involved
in request processing. In figure 2, we define the canonical
operations performed by any middleware.
The µbroker is the core component that provides support
for interaction between the canonical services:
• addressing manages references of entities connected to
the middleware,
• binding handles a connection with the remote nodes,
• representation takes care of marshaling and unmar-
shaling when necessary,
• interaction manages the liaisons between connected
entities in the application,
• protocol supports the transmission between two nodes
thanks to the network link,
• typing manages the typing system in the application
(sophisticated when it comes to CORBA any mecha-
nism for instance),
• transport handles the physical line,
• activation ensures that a concrete entity is available to
execute requests,
• execution assigns resources to process the requests.
In [13], we presented PolyORB, our implementation of a
schizophrenic middleware. PolyORB is a free software mid-
dleware framework. We assessed its suitability to build mid-
dleware platforms to support multiple heterogeneous spec-
ifications (CORBA, Ada Distributed Systems Annex, Web
Applications, Ada Messaging Service close to Sun’s JMS,
OMG DDS) and as a COTS for industry projects.
3.2 Code generation with Ocarina
Our code generation strategy consists in using AADL to
describe the user requirements as well as the deployment
information. We reuse the schizophrenic architecture and
its canonical functions to automatically generate most of
them in order to implement an AADL distribution model
restricted to those features required by the application. We
take advantage of the deployment information to statically
instantiate the policies needed. To do so, we had to revisit
PolyORB implementation as its initial version was based
on design patterns. The new schizophrenic middleware,
PolyORB-HI, is composed of a minimal middleware core and
several automatically generated functions.
PolyORB-HI strictly follows restrictions set by High-Integrity
applications on object orientation, scheduling, use of mem-
ory. It was developed in Ada95. It is compliant with both
the Ravenscar profile and the High-Integrity system restric-
tions (Annexes D and H of the Ada standard). High-Integrity
system restrictions are facilities provided by the Ada stan-
dard to help developers understanding their program, re-
viewing its code and restricting the language constructs that
might compromise (or complicate) the demonstration of pro-
gram correctness. Most of these restrictions are enforced at
compile time (no dispatching, no floating point, no allocator,
etc.). This simply yet efficiently enforces no unwanted fea-
tures are used by the middleware, increasing the confidence
in the code generated while limiting its complexity.
We defined our distribution model as a set of sender/receiver
tuples that interact through asynchronous oneway messages.
This allows for clean support of the Ravenscar model of com-
putation. It is supported by an AADL architectural model
that defines the location of each node, and the payload of
the message exchanged as a thread-port name plus possi-
ble additional data. From a system’s AADL description,
we compute required resources, then generate code for each
logical node. We review the elements supporting this distri-
bution model:
1. Naming table lists one entry per remote node that can
be reached, and one entry per opened communication
channel on this node. We build one static table per
node, computed from the topology of the interactions
described in the AADL model. It is indexed by an enu-
meration affecting one tag per logical node, resulting
in O(1) access time to communication handlers (e.g.
sockets, SpaceWire).
2. Marshallers handle type conversion between network
streams and actual application data. They are derived
from data components and thread interfaces, they de-
scribe the structure of data to be exchanged. This is
computed beforehand from the AADL models, code
has O(payload) complexity.
3. Stubs and skeletons handle the construction and anal-
ysis of network messages. Stubs transform a request
for an interaction into a network stream, skeletons
do the opposite operation. Both elements are built
from AADL components interface and actual interac-
tion between threads. We exploit this knowledge to
have O(payload) components.
4. Protocol instances are asynchronous communication
channels, set up at node initialization time. The com-
plexity of the action performed by these instances de-
pends on the underlying transport low-level layer (e.g.
sockets, SpaceWire).
5. Concurrent objects handle the execution logic of the
node. We build one task per periodic or sporadic
AADL thread. Subsequent tasks are built for the man-
agement of the transport low-level layer (at least one
additional task to handle incoming network messages).
Finally, we build one protected object (mutex-like en-
tity) to allow for communication between tasks. Let
us note all these objects strictly follow the Ravenscar
Computation Model.
These elements will be later refined in section 5.
The generated code provides a framework that will call
directly user code when necessary. This relieves the user
from the necessity to know an extensive API, and allows
a finer control of the behavior of the system that is under
the sole responsibility of the code generation patterns. The
generated code can be interfaced with the user code attached
to AADL threads.
4. LEVERAGINGADA 2012 AND SPARK 2014
Ada 2012 [12] is the latest revision of the Ada program-
ming language. One of the most interesting features in the
context of code generation is the capability to attach con-
tracts to subprograms as pre and post-conditions, or invari-
ants applied to types. This brings to Ada a feature that
existed in other languages like Fortran, Eiffel, and SARK.
Ada 2012 rationale [2] lists all details of this feature. Other
new additions related to expressions, iterators or multi-core
processing are noticeable, but not relevant to our experi-
ments. These will not be discussed here
SPARK 2014 [1] is built on top of Ada 2012 well-defined
semantics and definition of run-time errors, as well as programming-
by-contract constructs to bring to the user evidence his code
will under no circumstances raise a runtime error or that all
contracts are true. SPARK 2014 relies on the same con-
cepts as the initial SPARK language and toolset: definition
of a sound subset of Ada, combined with a Ada processor
that generates Verification Conditions (VCs). VCs denotes
boolean predicates that should be proved correct (or dis-
charged) based on the current context of a call, or on existing
hypothesis such as assertions or pre and post-conditions.
4.1 Adapting for Ada 2012
Updating PolyORB-HI/Ada to Ada 2012 requires first
capturing the relevant features that deserve attention. Be-
ing implemented in Ada95 and regular restrictions, compil-
ing the existing code base under Ada 2012 language defini-
tion does not require any modification thanks to backwards
compatibility. Yet, the current code base makes extensive
usage of assertions in the form of pragma Assert in the im-
plementation code to assess the validity of input parameters.
These can be re-implemented as pre-conditions, attached to
subprogram signatures as shown in this example:
package PolyORB HI . Messages i s
−− . . .
function Sender (M : Message Type )
return Entity Type
with Pre => ( Val id (M) ) ;
−− Ensure M i s v a l i d
private
subtype PDU Index i s Stream Element Count
range 0 . . PDU Size ;
subtype PDU i s Stream Element Array
(1 . . PDU Index ’ Last ) ;
Empty PDU : constant PDU := (others => 0 ) ;
type Message Type i s record
Content : PDU := Empty PDU;
F i r s t : PDU Index := 1 ;
Last : PDU Index := 0 ;
end record ;
function Valid (M : Message Type )
return Boolean i s
(M. F i r s t >= M. Content ’ F i r s t
and then M. F i r s t < M. Last
and then M. Last <= M. Content ’ Last ) ;
Such adaptations are truly minor adaptations of the ex-
isting code base, and do not require excessive rewritings.
4.2 Introducing SPARK 2014
Adaptations towards SPARK2014 require a more com-
plex reengineering of the existing code base. First, one
needs to understand in-depth the additional requirements of
SPARK2014, and adapt to these. Luckily enough, SPARK2014
is a much more extensive language subset than its ancestor
SPARK2005. In the context of PolyORB-HI, this means
• contracts: No need for extensive additions of SPARK-
specific contracts for global variables, package visibil-
ity, etc. All these are now deduced when need to be,
and not necessary for checking for the absence of run-
time errors, or validity of pre- and post-conditions;
• generics: Ada generic packages are allowed. They are
used extensively in PolyORB-HI/Ada to support code-
generation driven instantiations of message queues, mes-
sage marshallers or task artifacts;
• access types: Use of access types is explicitly forbid-
den. The runtime does not use access types for dy-
namic memory allocation. Yet, a few occurrences of
access type are present in the generated code for the
implementation of routing matrix. For each thread,
we need a structure that holds the destinations associ-
ated to each outgoing ports. In the initial design of the
runtime, these were encoded as static arrays following
this pattern: For each port, an array encoding all des-
tinations is generated; its address is used in an array
indexed by the port type. This was to circumvent the
limitation in Ada in creating non-rectangular 2D ar-
rays, so as to limit memory consumption, as shown in
this example:
Foo Dest inat ions :
constant Foo Dest inat ions Array :=
Foo Dest inat ions Array ’
(1 => Foo Signal K ) ;
Task Foo Dest inat ions :
constant Foo Address Array :=
( Foo Port => Foo Dest inat ions ’ Address ) ;
We changed this code pattern to implement a func-
tion that returns this array, avoiding the need for an
Address attribute, at the expense of a slight memory
consumption increase.
Let us note SPARK2014 has other restrictions we had to
mitigate. We discuss them in section 5. These restrictions
correspond to situation where we need bindings to C func-
tion or unchecked conversions. These functions are required
for the proper operation of the middleware and have been
kept as-is. We made usage of the SPARK_Mode aspect to
hide some elements of the implementation, and kept those
as minimal as possible.
4.3 Addressing concurrency
More problematic to the current definition of SPARK2014
and associated implementations is the lack of support for
concurrency constructs. PolyORB-HI/Ada uses the Raven-
scar model of computation, it thus needs tasks and protected
objects. Yet, we may work-around this issue.
4.3.1 Revisiting the Ravenscar Profile
Let us recall that the intent when moving to SPARK2014
is to demonstrate the absence of run-time errors. Consid-
ering we are under the restrictions of the Ravenscar profile,
we can make the following statements:
• Use of tasks: A task has no entry, it can either execute
sequential code, or makes use of a protected object.
To demonstrate that a task cannot cause a runtime-
error, it is therefore sufficient to demonstrate that the
sequential code is correct, and the pre-conditions for
calling entries or procedures on protected object are
met;
• Use of protected object procedures Protected object pro-
cedures cannot block as a consequence of the pragma
Detect Blocking. Furthermore, in PolyORB-HI/Ada
they do not call any other protected objects. As a con-
sequence, these are equivalent to sequential code. The
conditions for a run-time error in such procedures are
therefore reduced to runtime error in sequential code,
or violation of the Ceiling policy. The latter can be
assessed through external code reviews by reviewing
accessors of the protecting object;
• Use of protected object entries By symmetry with the
previous case, entries share the same considerations.
Besides, they cannot use the requeue mechanism. Hence,
these are limited to sequential code encapsulated in an
entry block.
Hence, per construction of the Ravenscar profile, concur-
rency constructs can induce run-time errors only in a limited
number of situations, namely violations of the ceiling proto-
col or blocking inside a protected object procedure or entry.
We take advantage of this to revisit our code generation
strategy.
4.3.2 Updating code generation strategies
From the previous considerations, we may now update
code generation strategies implemented in Ocarina:
• Management of tasks Tasks are used for implementing
one of the AADLv2 dispatching policy: periodic, spo-
radic, background, timed, hybrid or aperiodic. The
generated code instantiates one generic package that
implements the corresponding task skeleton.
In the context of SPARK2014, we revisited this pat-
tern, and decided to diverge from the Ravenscar profile
and introduce a Round-Robin non-preemptive sched-
uler. Under this scheduling policy, we instantiate a re-
duced task skeleton that is limited to an infinite loop
executing user code, without usage of Ada tasking.
This skeleton is a simple function that represents an
AADLv2 thread automata, made of initialization code
and a call to the user code.
• Management of queues Protected objects are used to
support message exchanges between tasks. We split
the implementation of this package in two separate
packages: one package implementing the management
of the message queue; another being the implemen-
tation of the protected message queue. Under the
Round-Robin non-preemptive scheduler, we use the
non-protected variant; under the Ravenscar implemen-
tation, we use the protected variant.
As a consequence, we can now generate SPARK2014 com-
pliant code from AADL models under the hypothesis of
tasks being scheduled under a non-preemptive Round-Robin
scheduler. Should we achieve formal proof of this code, then
we have arguments to derive similar results in the case of
a Ravenscar-compliant model through additional review or
testing.
• Correct usage of Ceiling protocol is reduced to external
review of the control flow of the program. In our set-
ting, each protected object is associated with a ceiling
priority set to the maximum value. Hence violations
are not possible.
• Correct implementation of the task skeletons used in
the Ravenscar-compilant case. We rely on existing
well-known patterns from [4], these are validated from
extensive usage.
Other potential errors due to the use of Ravenscar profile
are yet to be determined, yet we are confident those will be
limited to simple cases.
5. DEMONSTRATING ABSENCE OF RUN-
TIME ERRORS
Having adapted code generation strategies for Ada2012
and SPARK2014, we now discuss in this section the applica-
tion of the SPARK2014 toolset to demonstrate the absence
of runtime errors in both the PolyORB-HI/Ada middleware
and generated code.
For this study, we considered the usage of the GNATProve
GPL 2014 edition. The input AADL model used is from [7],
and is derived from the case study from [4]. This model
exhibits a set of periodic threads interchanging data. We
simply adapted it to use the non-preemptive Round Robin
scheduler we introduced instead of a Ravenscar preemptive
one. Although the functional code is relevant, we will fo-
cus only on the proof of absence of runtime errors of the
generated code and the underlying middleware.
In our setting, GNATProve generates Verification Condi-
tions (VCs) based on possibility of a runtime error (and an
exception being raised), or due to pre-conditions. Thanks
to the GNAT front-end technology, GNATProve generated
VCs only for the non-trivial cases that cannot be eliminated
by the front-end. Hence, several potential VCs, per strict
compliance to the Ada Reference Manual, are discharged
internally and not shown to the user.
5.1 PolyORB-HI/Ada code
We first review each package of the current distribution,
and discuss how to prove absence of runtime errors.
• PolyORB_HI, PolyORB_HI.Errors, PolyORB_HI.Streams:
these packages only define types, there is no code asso-
ciated, hence no generation of Verification Conditions;
• PolyORB_HI.Port_Kinds: this package defines enumer-
ation types for ports and basic test function. Although
code exists, it is simple enough to not require any gen-
eration of Verification Conditions;
• PolyORB_HI.Utils: this package defines basic conver-
sion function, bounded string manipulation API. All
21 functions are considered, 16 VCs are generated and
fully discharged;
• PolyORB_HI.Output: this package defines basic output
function that emulates Ada.Text IO.Put Line using a
thin binding over the C function write, along with
basic formatting.
Let us note that we take advantage of the SPARK_Mode
aspect to hide from the toolset code that make thread-
safe calls to the print functions. Similarly, the binding
to the C function write() is hidden from the toolset,
as it uses C pointers.
Only the functions in charge of formatting text are
“seen” by the toolset. The 14 associated functions
yields to 13 VCs fully discharged;
• PolyORB_HI.Protocols: this package provides a single
function, which is a wrapper that simply calls gener-
ated corresponding function from generated code in
PolyORB_HI.Generated.Transport to send requests.
It does not have proper VCs generated
• PolyORB_HI.Suspenders: this package provides a mech-
anism to support a synchronized start of all tasks. It
relies on two Ada runtime packages (Ada.Real_Time
and Ada.Synchronous.Task_Control) to either suspend
the environment task (using a delay until) or awake all
tasks.
Although SPARK2014 does not fully support these
packages, the way primitives operations are used is
compatible with the supported toolset. Since the code
simply iterates through bounded arrays (denoting tasks
to be awaken), it does not cause any VC to be gener-
ated.
• PolyORB_HI.Messages: this package is in charge of the
request life cycle: building, marshalling elements, en-
capsulation of message destination, etc. This package
makes heavy usage of arrays to represent the underly-
ing message, and copying to perform marshalling and
encapsulation of data.
This package has 16 functions, generating 35 VCs. We
note 5 VCs are not discharged. These are related to
the usage of slicing operation, for which the toolset
requires some enhancements.
• PolyORB_HI.Port_Type_Marshallers and
PolyORB_HI.Time_Marshallers: these packages instan-
tiate the generic package PolyORB_HI.Marshallers_G.
This package provides generic marshalling functions
based on performing an unchecked conversion from a
base type to a corresponding array of Stream Elements.
To date, this package cannot be proved as the toolset
does not support the Size attribute. More problem-
atic, SPARK_Mode, as of GNATProve GPL2014, is in-
operant on generic packages: these are systematically
considered for proof. These instances have been iso-
lated in a package, and hidden from the toolset.
• The generic packages PolyORB_HI.Null_Periodic_Task
and PolyORB_HI.Thread_Interrogators support re-
spectively the task skeleton and the message queue
used for our Round-Robin scheduling strategy. Being
generic packages, these can only be proved at instance-
level. The generic package cannot be proved alone.
Let us note that the following packages were outside of
this study: all packages implementing task skeletons and
protected queues, PolyORB_HI.Scheduler (used for task mi-
gration) and PolyORB_HI.Transport_Low_Level (used in a
distributed setting). This code requires support for tasking,
or access to networking APIs that are currently not avail-
able.
From this first round of analysis, we conclude that the
toolset is able to proof a significant portion of the code of
the runtime. This can be explained by the extensive usage
of simple patterns compatible with High-Integrity require-
ments: no dynamicity, basic transformations, etc. Handling
slice operations is a known-issue, this is likely to be ad-
dressed by enhancing the GNATProve toolset.
5.2 Generated code
We now review code generated from the AADL model,
and bound to the PolyORB-HI/Ada runtime.
• PolyORB_HI.Generated.Types: this package defines types
mapped from AADL types. There is no code and no
VC associated;
• PolyORB_HI.Generated.Deployment: this package de-
fines types derived from the deployment information
from the AADL model: name of threads, processes.
There is no code, but 17 VCs associated. They cor-
respond to elaboration code to build an id-to-string
correspondance table.
• PolyORB_HI.Generated.Marshallers: this packages de-
fines per-type marshaller/unmarshaller functions. All
32 functions, 23 VCs could be discharged completely;
• PolyORB_HI.Generated.Transport: this package im-
plements the send/receive operation used by AADL
threads to communicate. In a local setting, these func-
tions simply dispatch the request to the local message
queue. 8 functions are generated, 3 VCs out of 4 could
not be proved. They relate to pre-conditions that can-
not be fullfilled: similarly to the PolyORB_HI.Messages
package, the corresponding code performs slicing oper-
ations, for which support at proof-level is incomplete;
• PolyORB_HI.Generated.Activity: this package instan-
tiates task skeletons and message queues from the set
of threads and ports of the AADL model. Proof of
the task skeleton is trivial, and leads to no VC genera-
tion as we simply call in sequence two functions. Proof
of the message queue in a non-protected case is a bit
more complex, as it involved 50 VCs, of which 7 are
not discharged. As stated previously, slicing is again
the main issue.
5.3 Lessons learnt
In this experiment, we were mostly interested in demon-
strating the absence of runtime errors. We used GNATProve
GPL2014 as an oracle to report on potential issues. Surpris-
ingly, the process went smoothly: most of the VCs could be
proved at the first round. A few were discharged after rewrit-
ing part of the code to cover some corner cases (e.g. non-
initialized variable, potential out-of-bound execution, etc.).
These were corrected and integrated in PolyORB-HI/Ada.
Although GNATProve allows one to use an IDE to dis-
charge proof manually, we note it was not necessary in our
case. On the one hand, the code complexity is quite small,
despite the services being made. The runtime mostly trans-
forms data, and moves it to queues. On the other hand, some
code patterns like slicing cause troubles. We decided not to
change them with manual copies through loops: reports on
SPARK2014 forums indicate this is being addressed. Hope-
fully, the full code base will soon be fully proved in the next
iteration of the SPARK2014 toolset.
Finally, time to run the toolset in an automatic way to
discharge VCs is reasonably low. The full analysis of code
generated + runtime is less than 3 minutes to cover the
corresponding 5 kSLOCs.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we aimed at leveraging both Ada 2012 and
SPARK 2014 to assess the absence of run-time errors in a
restricted middleware that is used for code generation from
AADL models using Ocarina and PolyORB-HI/Ada. The
initial implementation already includes many restrictions for
both the Ravenscar profile, and the High-Integrity domain.
We first introduced how we updated the existing code
base to use Ada 2012 pre- and post-conditions, and then
adaptation to work-around restrictions of SPARK 2014. We
also discussed a few corner cases when this was not possi-
ble (bindings to C functions, unchecked conversion). Noting
the strong restriction set by the absence of concurrency con-
structs, we introduced a restricted non-preemptive scheduler
in the runtime to evaluate sequential code with a good level
of coverage. We also introduced arguments to exploit results
in a Ravenscar-context by translating some of the results,
combined with careful code review.
Future work will consider two directions: impact of the
code refactoring on time and memory performances; fur-
ther definition of the contracts to demonstrate the code im-
plemented matches the actual semantics as defined in the
AADLv2 standard. The second item is likely to stretch
SPARK2014 limits in terms of proof of complex contracts.
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